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ABSTRACT 
My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several 
seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral 
responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral 
responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over 
which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where 
agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some 
to abandon the control-based account of responsibility and replace it with an alternative 
account. It leads others to deny the intuition that agents are responsible in these 
troublesome cases. After outlining the account of moral responsibility I have in mind, I 
look at some of the arguments made against the viability of this theory. I show that there 
are conceptual resources for salvaging the control account, focusing in particular on the 
nature of vigilance. I also argue that there is empirical data that supports the control 
account so conceived. 
 
Introduction 
My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several 
seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral 
responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral 
responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over 
which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where 
agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some 
to abandon the control-based account of responsibility and replace it with an alternative 
account. It leads others to deny the intuition that agents are responsible in these 
troublesome cases. 
 After outlining the account of moral responsibility I have in mind, I look at some 
of the arguments made against the viability of this theory. I show that there are 
conceptual resources for salvaging the control account. In particular, I focus on the nature 
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of vigilance. Vigilance is a disposition to become occurrently aware of morally or 
prudentially relevant considerations that constitute a sufficient reason to act or omit. I 
sketch the role that vigilance plays in our moral agency and indicate the way in which 
appeals to vigilance can expand the explanatory scope and plausibility of control-based 
accounts of responsibility. I also suggest that there is empirical data that supports my 
account of vigilance. 
 
I. The Capacity Account of Moral Responsibility 
Consider three variations on a story. 
 Josie, your infant child, is sitting in her high chair at dinner. During the meal, she 
 spills some of her food onto the carpet. 
 
 Chuckie, your not-yet-house-trained puppy, is sitting at your feet during dinner. 
 During the meal, she goes to the bathroom on the carpet. 
 
 Paul, your adult roommate, is eating dinner with you. During the meal, he throws 
 his plate, full of food, directly at the wall. 
 
Everyone agrees that Josie and Chuckie are not morally responsible for what they do.1 
That is, nobody would blame them for what they did. Everyone agrees that Paul is 
																																																								
1 In this paper, I am concerned solely with moral responsibility. Any talk of ‘responsibility’ is shorthand for 
‘moral responsibility’. Additionally, I am concerned solely with the accountability sense of responsibility, 
rather than the attributability or answerability senses (cf. Shoemaker 2015), where the accountability sense 
of responsibility picks out a range of attitudinal responses bound up in non-trivial ways to the Strawsonian 
reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt (Strawson 1962). Finally, I examine only 
retrospective responsibility, or responsibility for what one has done. 
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(absent some excusing condition) responsible for what he does.2 The natural explanation 
for the different assessments is that Josie is a child and Chuckie is an animal, while Paul 
is an adult. Adults are responsible for their behavior while infants and animals are not. 
 The reason behind the difference is that adults possess a wider range of 
competences and abilities that underwrite certain expectations we have about what people 
will do in certain situations. Infants and animals simply do not possess these competences 
and abilities. So, the reason that we treat Paul differently from Chuckie and Josie (in this 
context) is that Paul possesses the ability to recognize and behave in accordance with the 
expectations that people have of him. Chuckie and Josie have no comparable ability, so 
they are not responsible for what they do.  
 This explanation points to a particular general theory of responsibility, namely 
that agents are responsible in virtue of possessing and exercising certain agential 
capacities.3 The capacities in question are just those that enable adults to engage in forms 
of behavior that children and animals cannot. Let’s call this theory, for ease of reference, 
the capacity account of responsibility (hereafter, Capacity Account), because the theory 
takes as central to the nature of responsibility the possession and exercise of particular 
agential capacities. 
 The Capacity Account specifies two broad classes of capacities the possession of 
which constitutes moral agency. The first class comprises those capacities needed for 
self-governance. These are the capacities under discussion in standard free will debates. 
The second class comprises those capacities needed for agential awareness. These are 
																																																								
2 This is somewhat overstated. I mean that for anyone who holds that people are sometimes morally 
responsible for what they do, that person will agree that Paul is morally responsible for what he does. 
3 Fischer and Ravizza (1998); van Inwagen (1983); Vargas (2013); Wallace (1994); Wolf (1990); Nelkin 
(2008); Raz (2011). 
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broadly epistemic capacities like perception, foresight, means-end reasoning, etc. 
Possession of a suitable range of capacities across these two classes constitutes moral 
agency. 
 These capacities are central to moral agency (on the Capacity Account) because 
these capacities enable agents to recognize, appreciate, and respond to moral reasons. The 
epistemic capacities are needed to perceive reasons and appropriately weigh reasons 
against each other in deliberation. The self-governance capacities are needed to align 
one’s behavior with one’s view of the arrangement of moral reasons. The Capacity 
Account, then, implies that moral agency comprises a range of abilities that enable agents 
to appropriately self-govern themselves in the light of reasons. 
 At a high level of generality, the Capacity Account posits the following 
conditions for responsibility for actions and outcomes. 
(1) Agent is morally responsible for x (some action or outcome) when Agent 
possesses control with respect to x or with respect to some process p that normally 
and reliably issues in x, and; 
(2) Agent is morally responsible for x when Agent sees (or foresees) or should have 
seen (or should have foreseen) that either: 
a. x’ing is itself either morally right or wrong, or 
b. x’ing or bringing it about that p would likely lead to the occurrence of 
some morally undesirable or desirable state of affairs. 
 
These conditions correspond to the two classes of capacities that jointly constitute moral 
agency. Moral agents are responsible for their conduct in virtue of fulfilling these 
conditions at the relevant time.  Thus, the Capacity Account establishes symmetrical 
conditions on moral agency and responsibility. That is, the conditions on responsibility 
for actions (and responsibility for outcomes) fall out neatly from the account of moral 
agency. 
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II. Arguments against the Capacity Account 
The Capacity Account follows nicely from certain intuitions about responsibility and has 
a wide explanatory scope with a small number of conditions. Recently, however, some 
have pointed out problems with the Capacity Account. These problems target either the 
plausibility of the Capacity Account or the scope of the theory. 
 Recall that the Capacity Account implies that human beings exhibit a particular 
form of moral agency constituted by agential capacities that fall into two distinct classes. 
A plausibility argument against the Capacity Account targets the theory of agency and 
uses these arguments to undermine the plausibility of the theory of responsibility. John 
Doris, for example, argues that the conditions on moral agency posited by the Capacity 
Account are such that agents rarely (if ever) fulfill such conditions.4 He claims that 
agents rarely exhibit self-control (of the sort specified by the Capacity Account) over 
their actions because situational factors of which the agent is unaware causally influence 
decision-making. Because one’s decisions are subject to influence by a large number of 
factors that operate below the level of awareness, this precludes control over one’s 
decisions and, by extension, behavior. Thus, Doris argues that if the Capacity Account 
were true, then we would rarely be responsible because we rarely fulfill the conditions on 
moral agency. But we are frequently responsible, so the Capacity Account (and its 
attendant theory of moral agency) must be false. 
 Scope arguments claim that the Capacity Account generates assessments of 
certain cases that conflict with our intuitions. In general, these cases describe some agent 
																																																								
4 Doris (2015: 43). 
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that appears to behave in some morally significant way despite lacking or failing to 
exercise the capacities that constitute moral agency.5 Here’s one example, taken from  
Randy Clarke’s work: 
Milk. As I’m about to leave my office at the end of the workday, my wife 
calls to tell me we’re out of milk. My regular route home takes me right by 
a grocery store, and I tell her I’ll stop and buy some. Between my office 
and the store, I start to think about a paper I’m writing on omissions. I 
continue thinking about my work until I arrive home, where I realize that 
I’ve forgotten the milk.6 
 
Let’s name the individual in this story Joel. Joel is responsible for failing to pick up milk 
despite being unaware of this failure. Thus, at the relevant time, Joel is unaware that his 
behavior is likely to issue in an undesirable state of affairs. Hence, Joel fails to satisfy 
condition (2.b) of the Capacity Account. So, the Capacity Account cannot accommodate 
the intuition that Joel is responsible. 
 There are two ways for proponents of the Capacity Account to respond to these 
arguments that are initially unsatisfying. The first is to introduce a tracing principle. 
Traces allow proponents of the Capacity Account to connect some moment where an 
agent fails to fulfill the Capacity Accounts conditions on responsibility back to some 
prior moment where the agent fulfills the Capacity Account conditions on responsibility 
and behaves in a way that explains the later failure to exercise her capacities. So, for 
example, we can explain Joel’s failure to get the milk in terms of some prior behavior 
that explains why Joel fails to get the milk.7 Similarly, proponents of the Capacity 
Account can note that even if people rarely possess control over and awareness of their 
decisions and actions, it is implausible to suppose that agents never possess control and 																																																								
5 See Frankfurt (1998), Scanlon (1998, 2008), Smith (2005, 2008, 2015) 
6 Clarke (2014: 164). Clarke does not cite this example in support of a scope argument. 
7 For some attempts, see Ginet (2000), Fischer and Tognazzini (2009), and Timpe (2011). 
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awareness. Thus, while rare, agents exhibit enough control and awareness to anchor 
responsibility ascriptions in those moments where agents lack control and awareness.8 
 While the tracing mechanism might provide an explanation for certain failures, it 
is unclear that tracing will be ubiquitously applicable in the relevant cases. There appear 
to be cases where an agent is responsible for some behavior despite never fulfilling at 
some earlier time the Capacity Account conditions on responsibility in a way that 
explains an agent’s responsibility when that agent lacks either control or awareness.9 In 
fact, Milk seems to be an example of just this sort! Reliance on tracing, especially in 
cases like Milk, seems misguided. Another reason for skepticism about the prospects of 
applying a tracing mechanism to explain responsibility in these cases is that tracing does 
not fit into our phenomenology of blame. That is, we find it appropriate to blame the 
agent in question in the absence of identifying a potential anchor for a trace.10 For these 
reasons, a successful response on behalf of the Capacity Account ought to specify 
conditions on responsibility that do not include some tracing principle (at least, 
proponents of the Capacity Account ought not to include a tracing mechanism to explain 
cases of this sort; there may be other principled reasons to include a tracing mechanism 
that warrant the inclusion of this mechanism in one’s theory). 
 Second, proponents of the Capacity Account might say that all of these arguments 
are easily rebutted by the inclusion of a normative element in condition (2.b). Thus, Joel 
is responsible because he should have been aware of needing to get the milk. The initial 
																																																								
8 Though his motivations were different, van Inwagen (1989) raised similar worries about the scarcity of 
control that agents possess. The suggestion I countenance above is the one he suggests. Even if the scope of 
controlled action is relatively small, we can use tracing mechanisms to maintain the relatively wide scope 
of moral responsibility. 
9 Cf. Sher (2009: 83). 
10 Doris (2015: 155). See also Graham (2014: 399). 
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formulation of the conditions on responsibility for the Capacity Account appears built to 
respond to objections of just this kind. So what’s all the fuss about? 
  The problem with normative responsibility conditions is that these do not 
establish any clear link between the agent and her actions. To see this, consider a normal 
case of culpable wrongdoing. When an agent fulfills the responsibility conditions in this 
normal case, the moral qualities of the act figure into the set of considerations to which 
the agent is sensitive. When the agent acts wrongly in light of these considerations it is 
possible to draw a direct line from the negative moral qualities of the action to some 
moral feature of the agent. When, however, we invoke some normative condition to 
explain responsibility, this direct line disappears.  
 The Milk case makes this point more concrete. When Joel gets home, his partner 
reprimands him for not getting the milk. When Joel responds that he didn’t realize what 
he was doing, we can imagine his partner saying: “Well you should have known.” But 
what does Joel’s partner mean here? Joel does not realize that he is failing to do 
something and certainly doesn’t realize that he is violating some norm about paying 
attention to what he is doing. Thus, the partner appears to explain Joel’s responsibility for 
failing to get the milk by appealing to some failure to discharge his epistemic duties. 
This, however, is just to explain responsibility for a failure by appealing to another 
failure. The explanation does not appear to provide any means for drawing a line of 
attribution from the wrongness of Joel’s behavior to any positive feature of Joel 
himself.11 So, the inclusion of some normative component within the responsibility 
conditions does not obviously answer any of the arguments offered against the Capacity 
Account.   																																																								
11 Sher (2009: 26-7, 74). 
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 Some philosophers use plausibility or scope arguments against the Capacity 
Account to motivate adopting some form of skepticism12 or revisionism13 about the 
nature of moral responsibility. I will not summarize these arguments here; instead, I 
propose to offer a response on behalf of the Capacity Account. In general, I claim that the 
Capacity Account has the resources to respond to the plausibility and scope arguments 
normally leveled against them. This, in turn, will preserve the isomorphism between 
responsibility and moral agency. I show that the Capacity Account can tell a plausible 
story about why agents in Milk-style cases are responsible for their behavior. To do this, I 
take up two questions. First, what sort of normative account explains responsibility in 
cases where agents seem to lack the capacities constitutive of moral agency? Second, 
what does it mean to possess the relevant suite of abilities connected to this normative 
account? 
 
III. Vigilance: The Conceptual Dimension 
Let me start this section by proposing a definition. Let some behavior B of an agent S be 
an unwitting omission when: (a) B is wrong or right in virtue of reason (or a set of 
reasons) r, and; (2) S B’s or fails to B without being aware of r under any morally 
relevant description.14 I introduce this term here because the arguments mentioned 
against the Capacity Account often invoke cases of unwitting omissions. This is to be 																																																								
12 Zimmerman (2008) and Rosen (2003, 2004). 
13 Smith (2005, 2008, 2015) and Scanlon (1998, 2008). This form of revisionism is distinct from the 
revisionism of Vargas (2013) and Nichols (2015). Vargas and Nichols are not revisionists about the 
centrality of capacities to moral responsibility.  
14 Here, the reasons are normatively connected to behavior. That is, in any context there will be normative 
reasons that speak in favor of certain forms of behavior and speak against others. Thus, when an agent 
unwittingly omits, the agent behaves in some way, but the reasons that speak against behaving in that way 
do not figure into the set of considerations to which the agent is actually sensitive. This account is designed 
to remain neutral between different theories of reasons. Internalists and externalists alike ought to be able to 
fill in the above proposal without any significant changes to the argument that I offer. 
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expected. After all, unwitting omissions by definition involve some failure to behave 
appropriately in light of some lack of awareness of the omitting agent. Alternatively, we 
could characterize an unwitting omission as any instance where an agent behaves in some 
morally significant way, but the moral significance of the behavior plays no causal or 
explanatory role in the agent’s so behaving.15 
 The lack of awareness constitutive of unwitting omissions seems to suggest that 
the unwitting agent in question lacks certain self-control capacities. In other words, 
awareness appears to be a necessary condition for control, so without awareness one also 
lacks the capacities that fall within the self-control class.16 With that in place, we can 
begin to look at the response on behalf of the Capacity Account. I propose to start with 
the normative dimension of this problem. That is, in virtue of what are agents culpable 
for unwitting omissions? 
 The normative basis for moral responsibility for unwitting omissions may be 
plausibly taken to involve some obligation to maintain a certain level of vigilance. The 
obligation to maintain vigilance has two components. The first is the property or ability 
that the obligation picks out. This, on my account, is vigilance. The vigilance of an agent 
consists of a disposition to become occurrently aware of morally or prudentially relevant 
																																																								
15 One consequence of this characterization is that it entails that no morally neutral behavior could be 
characterized as an unwitting omission. For example, on this account, if someone steps into the shower 
with socks on this would not count as an unwitting omission (assuming there is nothing morally significant 
about getting into the shower with your socks on). Someone might take issue with this consequence and 
thus take issue with the characterization itself. Randy Clarke (2014: 94) suggests that one might 
unwittingly omit in the context of a game. This dispute feels somewhat verbal, though we could (I think) 
characterize unwitting omissions as a species of unintentional omission, where unwitting omissions are 
those unintentional omissions that are morally significant.  
16 Even if responsibility theorists maintain a distinction between self-control and epistemic agential 
capacities, there is still a tendency to include some distinctive epistemic component in the self-control 
capacities, as in Vargas (2013: 201-202) and Ekstrom (2000: 67). For this reason, lack of awareness of 
some salient aspect of one’s moral environment might suffice to count an agent as lacking relevant self-
control capacities. 
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considerations that constitute a sufficient reason to act or omit.17 The exercise of this 
disposition constitutes the agent’s attunement to moral or prudential reasons to act. When 
those reasons constitute an obligation to act or omit, failures to act or omit is culpable. 
That is, vigilance enables an agent to increase or intensify one’s sensitivity to available 
moral reasons.18 
 The second component of the obligation is the level of vigilance that one is 
required to maintain. Levels of vigilance are measured in terms of how much effort one 
devotes to being aware of and attuned to one’s environment and acting in light of that 
awareness. Thus, the obligation makes demands on how much effort one ought to devote 
to paying attention. For example, the demand for vigilance with respect to driving is 
relatively low when one is driving on a dry, straight, wide stretch of empty highway in 
western Wyoming. The demand for vigilance increases when one is driving on a narrow, 
crowded city street during the night rush. 
 What sets the level of vigilance in a context is likely a function of one’s broader 
normative commitments. So, utilitarians, virtue theorists, and deontologists will likely 
have different explanations for shifting demands for vigilance. To see one way in which 
broader normative commitments might settle the level of vigilance demanded in a 																																																								
17 Pereboom (forthcoming: 185-86) also explains responsibility for unintentional omissions in terms of 
failures of vigilance. His conception of vigilance, however, is much narrower than the one in this paper. 
Pereboom describes vigilance as: “a persisting attunement to protect, which features, among other things, a 
standing disposition to respond to danger, triggered by indications of danger in the environment” (185). 
Vigilance, as I describe it, includes this disposition but also includes a range of other dispositions that have 
no connection to awareness of needs to protect (of course, there could be some naturalistic explanation of 
the development of vigilance that posits Pereboom’s disposition as a course-grained precursor to the more 
variegated and complex vigilance capacity that I countenance). Given Pereboom’s narrow conception of 
vigilance, he expresses skepticism that vigilance can furnish a general explanation of responsibility for 
unintentional omissions (186). Because I offer a thicker conception of vigilance, I take it that my vigilance 
account can furnish such a general explanation. 
18 Following Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998: 69) discussion, this sensitivity comes in two dimensions: 
receptivity and reactivity. Vigilance is connected to both, though the latter dimension is unimportant for the 
purposes of this paper. 
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context, consider what a classical utilitarian might say. Roughly, the classical utilitarian 
will say that the level of vigilance demanded in a context is a function of whatever 
actions will result in the maximization of relevant goods. 
 While the demanded of level of vigilance might be a function solely of some 
broader normative theory, the level might also be a function of more localized 
community practices. On this picture, the level of vigilance might be set by the 
expectations of some relevant subset of a particular community. These members of the 
community have certain reasonable expectations about how people will behave in certain 
domains and these expectations set the standard of vigilance that one ought to meet in 
those domains.19 
 The level of vigilance that one ought to maintain does substantial work in setting 
the normative basis for responsibility for unwitting omissions. Despite this theoretical 
load, it is difficult to offer a more substantive account without first adopting some 
controversial, higher-order normative commitments. Insofar as the vigilance account that 
I offer here aims to be relatively modular, I withhold offering a more substantive account 
of the level of vigilance that one ought to maintain. 
 A substantive account of the content of the norms of vigilance likely requires 
making more substantive higher-order normative commitments. However, more can be 
said about the function of the norms of vigilance while retaining the modularity of the 
account. 
 There are two important functional features of the norms of vigilance. The first is 
that the norms of vigilance function as derivative norms. These norms are derivative 
because they derive their status from primary norms. As I am using the distinction, a 																																																								
19 Cf. Vargas (2013: 214).  
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primary norm is such that one allows that norm to play a role in one’s cognitive economy 
simply in virtue of understanding the content of the norm. Thus, a norm is primary if, 
upon understanding the content of the norm, one needs no further reason to adopt or 
submit to that norm. A derivative norm, on the other hand, is such that one allows that 
norm to play a role in one’s cognitive economy only if, upon understanding the content of 
the norm, one also has some further reason to adopt the norm. The norms of vigilance are 
derivative because one only accepts the demands of these norms in virtue of accepting the 
demands of other norms or adopting other commitments. No one would, I submit, accept 
the demand for vigilance without some background web of normative commitments that 
supported accepting such a demand.20 
 Describing this dimension of the account requires a longer story. Roughly, as 
moral agents we seem committed to engaging in various activities that require us to 
allocate attention in efficient ways. For instance, we participate in meaningful 
relationships that sometimes require us to make and fulfill promises. And our 
commitment to living up to these relationships (by fulfilling our promises) does seem to 
require living up to some demand that is made on our attention. Thus, we seem to accept 
demands for vigilance in virtue of wider commitments that we have as moral agents. And 
without these wider commitments, there does not seem to be much reason to take on 
board a demand for vigilance. In this way, the norms of vigilance are derivative. 
 The second important functional feature of the norms of vigilance is that the 
norms are context-sensitive. The demand for vigilance is situationally indexed to account 
for a variety of environmental factors that might make it more difficult (in some sense) to 
display a certain level of vigilance. In particular, the demand is sensitive to the level of 																																																								
20 Cf. Raz (2011: 237-39) and Vargas (2013: 249; ms.). 
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cognitive effort needed to maintain a level of vigilance. The account needs this context-
sensitive component to account for the fact that the same vigilance capacity might be 
more or less personally available to the agent based on features of the agent’s 
environment.21 This feature of the account adds two things: (1) the same norm might 
make different demands on different individuals in the same context, and; (2) the same 
norm will make different demands on the same individual cross-situationally. These 
additions are needed to account for intuitions about certain cases. For instance, with this 
added dimension, we can make sense of why we excuse a foreigner for making an 
improper turn at a red light on a busy city street where we would not excuse a native for 
the same action. And, we might excuse someone for committing a social faux pas at a 
dinner party with royalty when we would not excuse them for committing a faux pas at a 
dinner party with friends and family. In general, the context-sensitivity of the demand for 
vigilance is a function of the stress that the environment puts on the vigilance 
mechanism. Given a certain threshold of stress, the demand is weakened to account for 
the additional effort needed to display appropriate levels of vigilance.  
 The normative account of responsibility for unwitting omissions identifies a 
relatively specific feature of an agent, vigilance, which I defined above as a disposition to 
become occurrently aware of morally salient features of the environment. The exercise of 
this disposition constitutes the agent’s attunement to the moral environment. Having this 
agential capacity warrants the application of a cognitive standard to the agent across a 
wide range of circumstances (namely, any circumstance in which the agent can exercise 
and calibrate her level of vigilance). Agents are culpable for falling short of this cognitive 																																																								
21 Note that this formulation remains neutral on whether situational factors themselves structure agential 
capacities or whether situational factors merely affect the operability of a particular capacity. 
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standard because they are obligated to maintain a certain level of vigilance over those 
capacities that the standard measures. Thus, the cognitive standard measures or tracks the 
level of vigilance that the agent manifests and applies to the agent in virtue of capacities 
that the agent possesses. 
 The norms of vigilance, on this account, are sensitive to two features of the 
vigilance capacity. On the one hand, the norms of vigilance correctly apply to some agent 
just because that agent possesses the appropriate disposition for vigilance. Insofar as 
vigilance is partially constitutive of moral agency, it follows that the norms of vigilance 
will only make demands on those agents that are capable of fulfilling the demands of 
those norms (this, in turn, follows from adopting the Capacity Account). On the other 
hand, the specific demands that the norms of vigilance make are a function of the degree 
to which one can fully exercise one’s vigilance. It might be more difficult in certain 
situations to achieve a certain level of attunement to the moral environment. Thus, the 
norms of vigilance reflect two facts about the vigilance capacity: 1) vigilance is a 
capacity like any other that some creatures possess and others do not, and; 2) vigilance is 
a flexible capacity that requires more or less effort to appropriately exercise across a wide 
range of scenarios. 
 In sum, there are three components to this normative dimension of vigilance. 
First, moral agents possess some disposition (vigilance) the exercise of which affords 
them some degree of attunement to normatively salient features of the environment. 
Second, certain derivative moral norms specify a cognitive standard that determines what 
level of vigilance moral agents ought to display within a context. Third, agents are 
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justifiably held to the demands of the norms of vigilance in virtue of having the ability to 
be vigilant.  
 Hence, the vigilance account explains culpability for unwitting omissions by 
appealing to the agent’s display of substandard awareness. One can see this in the Milk 
case. Joel is responsible for failing to bring home milk because he failed to exhibit the 
appropriate level of vigilance at the relevant time (and, we suppose, the circumstances 
were not such that the demand for vigilance made on Joel was unreasonable or unfair). 
This gives the vigilance account a certain theoretical advantage over revisionist positions. 
For instance, Angela Smith attempts to explain all responsibility for unwitting omissions 
in terms of a lack of due care.22 While this framework might explain some instances of 
responsibility for unwitting omissions, it seems to fail in other cases. After all, in Milk 
Joel simply seems to make a mistake.23 He has all the right attitudes toward fulfilling 
promises and showing respect for his partner. Yet he still fails to get milk. When we 
describe the case as a mistake the vigilance account can still furnish an adequate 
explanation. Explaining responsibility in terms of vigilance, rather than due care, seems 
more appropriate.  
 Note that as I have explained it here, the vigilance account functions as an 
explanatory framework for intuitive judgments about the culpability of unwitting 
wrongdoers. That is, we intuitively judge that sometimes agents are culpable for their 
unwitting omissions. As I noted above, explaining these judgments is problematic on a 
standard construal of the conditions for moral responsibility on a Capacity Account. With 
the vigilance account, the Capacity Account has an explanation for these judgments on 																																																								
22 See Smith (2005). 
23 Cf. Amaya (2013) and Amaya and Doris (2014). 
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hand. This account cannot, as described here, establish that an individual is culpable for 
an unwitting omission. Connecting the vigilance account back to some wider theory 
about the basis of culpability requires separate treatment. 
 
IV. Vigilance: The Empirical Dimension 
In the previous section, I proposed that the normative basis for moral responsibility for 
unwitting omissions involves the obligation to maintain a certain level of vigilance. This 
requires that agents possess some form of control over the levels of vigilance that they 
display (otherwise, the maintenance of vigilance would be something outside of the scope 
of one’s agential capacities). In short, my proposal seeks to add and describe an 
additional capacity within the Capacity Account picture, one that accounts for vigilance. 
 In this section, I want to look at recent work on the neuroscience of cognitive 
control. This is important because there are a number of empirical claims that the 
normative dimension of the vigilance account implies. For one, the normative dimension 
of the vigilance account implies that we realize a certain form of agency that has a certain 
underlying architecture (i.e., one that supports the ability to be vigilant). Because this 
robust empirical component falls out of the normative account, we need to determine 
whether the normative account has any empirical traction.24 
 To see why this is a worry, consider an analogy. Imagine a computer scientist that 
wants to build a device that can perform functions f, g, and h. The computer scientist 
designs a range of software to perform these functions. Now suppose that the computer 
scientist takes his idea and his software to an electrical engineer. The electrical engineer 																																																								
24 In this, I follow a suggestion made in Doris and Stich (2007). Normative theories often contain empirical 
elements or make strong implications about the way the world is. As such, normative theorizing ought to be 
constrained by empirical considerations to some degree. 
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could say that there is no way to build a machine that can run the computer scientist’s 
software. That is, the electrical engineer might say that we do not possess the physical 
resources to craft something that can perform the desired functions. Something similar, I 
think, can be said in the case of moral agency. The normative dimension of the vigilance 
account implies a certain conception of moral agency. One reason to go to the 
neuroscience is to figure out whether we have reason to believe that any biological 
organism possesses the physical make-up to perform the tasks demanded by the vigilance 
account.25 
 One long-standing assumption of neurologically grounded theories of behavior is 
that agents possess a disposition to behave in ways that will optimize the expenditure of 
resources with the expected benefits that accrue from such expenditures.26 One way of 
minimizing resource expenditures is to limit the allocation of control across a variety of 
mechanisms. A relatively basic or low-level notion of control is given by the action of 
those mechanisms responsible for configuring behavior in such a way that maximizes 
reward attainment. Control, thus understood, is cognitively ‘expensive’ or resource 
demanding. So agents benefit from activating control processes as little as possible. 
 A recent model of cognitive behavior, articulated by Jonathan Cohen, provides a 
framework for understanding the allocation of cognitive demand. The model, the 
‘expected value of control’ (EVC), predicts that allocation of control is based on the 
expected payoff from engaging a control process and the cost of achieving a payoff, 
where cost is analyzed (both psychologically and neurologically) in terms of exercising 
																																																								
25 This proposal does not suggest reducing moral agency to neurobiology. I consider and respond to this 
concern in the next section. 
26 Kool et al. 2010; Botvinick 2007. 
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this cognitive effort.27 EVC thus explains the integration of two sources of value-
information: 1) expected payoff from activating (or signaling) a control process, and; 2) 
cost of engaging control mechanisms. 
 The EVC explains the way in which agents directly control their cognitive 
abilities by allocating cognitive demands across cognitive processing structures that exact 
differential cognitive loads. Important task representations are allocated to cues in ways 
that involve high cognitive load while less important representations are allocated in 
ways that involve low cognitive load. The EVC explains how one does or does not 
maintain a state of vigilance and thus accounts for the way in which one can exercise 
control (or fail to exercise control) over the level of vigilance that one displays. 
Specifically, as mentioned above, important task representations (e.g., remembering 
anniversary dates, promises to get milk, or the location of car keys, etc.) can be encoded 
in ‘expensive’ ways that increase the likelihood of recall at the relevant time. 
Mechanisms specified by this framework realize the ability to exercise vigilance. 
 The EVC provides not only a way of explaining the allocation of cognitive 
resources; it also identifies a single system of mechanisms responsible for processing the 
inputs in the EVC model. According to Cohen, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
(dACC) integrates the various value inputs and determines where and how much control 
should be allocated to different cognitive tasks. The dACC interacts with other valuative 
and regulative systems to activate specific task units with control signals. In particular, 
the dACC regulates lower-level information processing mechanisms and monitors 
changing information about circumstances and signals that indicate whether certain 
																																																								
27 Botvinick and Cohen 2014; Shenhav, Botvinick, and Cohen 2013. 
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control signals ought to be readjusted.28 The dACC also communicates with the lateral 
prefrontal cortex (lPFC), which latter implements ‘decisions’ made by the dACC to 
allocate control.29 The dACC functions as a mechanism that realizes the agential ability 
to calibrate degrees of vigilance. 
 This interaction of psycho-physical processes provides a mechanism through 
which agents can exercise and calibrate degrees of vigilance. Vigilance, here, picks out a 
virtue of agents that is realized in these underlying neural structures and activities and 
provides for the awareness of the environment that the agent possesses. Agents can 
exercise and calibrate degrees of vigilance in three ways: (1) gathering more information 
to shift reward expectation; (2) searching for alternative sources of reward, or; (3) valuing 
long-term over short-term rewards. In this way, a crucial aspect of vigilance is explicable 
in terms of the EVC. 
 The functional account of vigilance does not settle various normative questions 
about how much vigilance is required and under what circumstances. What it does 
provide, however, is a conceptually and empirically adequate realizer for fulfilling some 
independently specified normative account of the duty to be vigilant. The normative 
account correlates with capacities that can be cashed out in empirically tractable ways. 
The mechanisms identified under the EVC model accounts for the moral valence of a 
variety of cognitive, perceptual, and memory failures. 
 Notice that this functional account of vigilance implies intuitive excusing 
conditions and explains why these conditions excuse. Normally, duress counts as an 																																																								
28 Empirical confirmation in Bogacz et al. 2010; Forstmann et al. 2008, 2010; Ivanoff et al. 2008; Molder et 
al. 2012; van Maanen et al. 2011. 
29 Empirical confirmation in Aron et al. 2007; Aron and Poldrack 2006; Cavanagh et al. 2011; Jahafri 2011; 
Wiecki and Frank 2013; King et al. 2010; Kerns 2006. ‘Decisions’, here, is shorthand for computations 
performed by the dACC that issue in signals to implement relevant task representations. 
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excuse for morally undesirable behavior. Within the framework of the EVC, this is 
understandable. Given certain stressors in the environment, one’s vigilance mechanism 
might be overwhelmed and thus fail to operate. For example, suppose that instead of 
thinking about a paper, Joel was thinking about a phone call that he received informing 
him that his father had died earlier that day. Under these circumstances, we would likely 
excuse Joel because his capacity to recognize and respond to his surroundings is 
swamped. Thinking about a paper does not overwhelm the vigilance mechanism in the 
same way, so we do not accept thinking about a paper as an excuse for failing to realize 
that one needs to go to the store. Again, the threshold that sets the standard for when the 
mechanism is overwhelmed likely results from some combination of objective facts about 
the cognitive effort needed to do what one ought and facts about what the community 
expects of similarly situated agents. 
 The functional account of vigilance actually implies an empirically verifiable 
hypothesis. Given that the model predicts that excuses for unwitting omissions ought to 
track the level of stress placed on an agent’s vigilance mechanism, we can test whether 
our folk psychological categories of excuses matches up with this prediction. This 
empirical work has not yet been done, though I suspect that there will be significant 
overlap between intuitions about whether an excusing condition obtains (in the case of an 
unwitting omission) and the level of stress that an environment places on an agent’s 
vigilance mechanism. There will likely be some slippage, i.e., cases where intuitions 
suggest excusing where the level of stress on the system is actually mild and cases where 
intuitions suggest withholding excuses where the level of stress is actually severe. 
However, absent some drastic divergence of the neuroscience from our folk 
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psychological categories, the EVC seems poised to vindicate this feature of our ordinary 
practices. 
 The development of the vigilance model provides a framework that explains why 
agents are morally responsible for their unwitting omissions. In these cases, agents are 
responsible because they should be aware of what they are doing but fail to be aware. The 
normative account of vigilance fills out what the relevant sense of ‘should’ is and posits a 
distinctive capacity, vigilance, the operation of which enables the agent to fulfill the duty 
to be aware. The empirical account of vigilance furnishes a mechanistic sketch of this 
normative capacity and specifies particular neural realizers for the relevant capacity. 
Given that agents possess this ability, we can see why the normative epistemic condition 
picks out a direct relationship between the agent and her behavior in cases of unwitting 
omission. When, for instance, Joel forgets the milk, there is a direct line between his 
failure to get milk and his vigilance capacity. 
 The addition of the vigilance account makes clear the response on behalf of the 
Capacity Account to the scope argument. The problem that the scope argument raises is 
that the Capacity Account generates assessments of particular cases that do not track our 
intuitive judgments about responsibility in an entire class of cases (namely wrongful 
unwitting omissions). The vigilance account provides resources to take this objection 
head-on. It does this by expanding the scope of the Capacity Account and provides 
principled reasons for accepting the machinery that accounts for this expansion. That is, 
the vigilance account countenances a specific feature of an agent (vigilance) that accounts 
for the culpability an agent bears for her unwitting omission. While the account appeals 
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to an unexercised capacity in these cases, the neuroscientific evidence provides support 
for the claim that agents possess this capacity even when they fail to exercise it.30 
 The vigilance model also provides the resources to respond to the plausibility 
argument against the Capacity Account. Recall that the plausibility argument targeted the 
theory of agency that the Capacity Account implies. Two responses to this criticism 
emerge from the foregoing account. First, one could directly deny the claim that agents 
realize the form of agency specified by the Capacity Account. Given that the 
neurobiological mechanisms are ordinary features of the human being, it seems 
implausible to say that agents rarely utilize these mechanisms to configure their behavior 
in controlled ways. Given that the mechanisms within the EVC are directly sensitive to 
valuative systems in the brain, it also seems odd to say that an agent’s view of reasons for 
acting (plausibly construed, at the neural level, as information about expected reward) 
plays an insignificant role in the production of action. 
 This response might be unsatisfying to some, but there is another response 
available in light of the vigilance account. The context-sensitivity of the norms of 
vigilance could address concerns raised by Doris and others. Because the norms of 
vigilance are sensitive to the level of stress placed on the vigilance mechanisms by 
features of the environment, it is open to proponents of the Capacity Account to say that 
demands shift to account for ‘noise’ that diminishes the availability of the vigilance 
mechanism and might make the exercise of control harder in a particular context. One 
could interpret the causal influence that situational factors exert on decision-making as 
noise that diminishes the demand for vigilance. The social psychology research that Doris 																																																								
30 This response is not likely to convince anyone skeptical of the idea of an unexercised capacity. Despite 
this, the response does show that the account has something principled to say for itself. 
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utilizes to fuel his plausibility argument might pick out a relatively isolated set of cases 
where our folk psychological categories fail to properly track the level of stress placed on 
an agent’s vigilance mechanism. Thus, instead of claiming (as Doris does) that we rarely 
exhibit the relevant form of control required for responsibility, we can offer a slightly 
revisionary account of control and make the case that our folk psychological categories 
fail to appreciate just how sensitive the mechanisms that mediate this control are to 
environmental noise. 
  More could be said, but the general picture is that the vigilance account offers 
some plausible routes to answer these arguments against the Capacity Account. This is 
because: (a) the vigilance account expands the explanatory scope of the standard 
construal of the Capacity Account, and; (b) the vigilance account contains a context-
sensitive element that accounts for the sensitivity that responsibility-relevant capacities 
display toward features of the environment.    
 
V. Objection 1: Reductionism and Agency 
In the next two sections, I want to briefly respond to two concerns with the vigilance 
account. The first objection concerns the relationship between the normative and 
empirical dimensions of the vigilance account and whether the normative dimension 
simply reduces to the empirical dimension. The second objection concerns whether the 
vigilance account provides the Capacity Account with an explanation of original (direct) 
or derivative moral responsibility for unwitting omissions. I take up the first objection in 
this section and the second objection in the next. 
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 One concern with the relationship between the empirical and normative 
dimension of vigilance is that the above account appears to reduce the normative (and 
thus some crucial aspect of our agency) to the empirical. A related concern is that this 
reduction invites a form of skepticism. After all, if vigilance just is neurobiological 
functioning, then what contribution does the agent herself make (and in what way can the 
agent herself calibrate and display varying levels of vigilance)? 
 This is an extremely difficult problem and will likely arise for any theory of 
responsibility, agency, or free will that incorporates some robust empirical component. 
By way of response, recall first that the purpose of including the empirical dimension of 
the vigilance account was twofold. First, the normative dimension of the vigilance 
account implies a number of empirical theses. Thus, the plausibility of the normative 
dimension of the account demands that we sketch at least some of the empirical 
implications of that dimension. Second, insofar as the empirical dimension confirms 
some of the empirical implications of the normative dimension, we have good evidence 
for the accuracy of the normative story. In particular, the empirical dimension supports 
the claim that agents possess a capacity for vigilance even when that capacity sometimes 
goes unexercised. Without the support of the empirical dimension, the normative 
dimension would seem hollow and speculative. 
 So there is good reason to include the empirical dimension of the account and thus 
good reason to explain away the worries about reductionism. The two dimensions of the 
above account can be thought of as descriptions of phenomena at various levels. In 
particular, the normative dimension is a description at a psychological or agential level, 
where our description includes terms like ‘agent’, ‘ability’, and ‘norm’. I do not mean to 
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imply, by this, that all psychological or agential descriptions are normative; rather, I 
mean that in explicating the normative content of the vigilance account, I took as basic 
particular psychological or agential concepts from which we can draw substantive 
conclusions. The empirical dimension is a description at a neurological level, where our 
description includes a number of mechanistic sketches that correlate to the activities at 
the psychological/agential level. 
 The neural mechanisms, in my view, realize the capacity for vigilance and 
mediate the agent’s control of her unwitting omissions. Additionally, these mechanisms 
function as neural correlates for the exercise (and failure to exercise) the capacity for 
vigilance. The language of realization and mediation is crucial here. Neither term implies 
or entails any kind of reduction to more fundamental entities. 
 One might think that the explanatory relevance of the empirical dimension to the 
normative dimension entails some kind of reduction, insofar as we can reduce the 
phenomenon of vigilance to the activity of its underlying neural mechanisms. This worry, 
however, does not apply to the vigilance account. The empirical dimension of the account 
specifies neural mechanisms that explain the phenomenon of allocation of cognitive 
demand. These mechanisms do not explain the ability posited by the normative 
dimension of the account; rather, the neural mechanisms are just neural correlates of the 
capacity for vigilance. Merely specifying neural correlates, however, is insufficient for 
causal explanation.31 Thus, the empirical dimension does not provide a causal 
explanation for the normative dimension of vigilance (in particular, the capacity for 
vigilance specified by the normative dimension of the account); rather, it provides a 
																																																								
31 Craver (2007: 60). 
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mechanistic sketch for a particular cognitive phenomenon, from which sketch we can 
plausibly infer the presence of the very capacity specified by the normative account. 
 This response, however, does not account for the agent. Where does the agent fit 
in given the empirical dimension of the account? While this is an important lacuna in the 
vigilance account presented here, it is not clear that the objection is relevant. As I 
presented it, the vigilance account is neutral between substantive theories of agency and 
action. Thus, in my view, one can plug in one’s preferred account of agency and theory 
of action and adjust the vigilance account accordingly. Because of this, it is not clear that 
the vigilance account provides some novel response (or is required to provide a novel 
response) to the skeptic over and above the responses already available from higher-level 
disputes. 
 
VI. Objection 2: Derivative and Original Responsibility 
The second objection concerns the kind of explanation offered by the vigilance account 
for unwitting omissions. This framework appears to offer explanations of derivative 
responsibility for unwitting omissions (where derivative responsibility for some x 
depends on some prior moment of original responsibility for some y that is suitably and 
foreseeably connected to x). That is, the responsibility for an unwitting omission is 
derivative on one’s responsibility for a failure of vigilance. The problem with this is that 
all of the problems with tracing (which is a necessary component of explanations of 
derivative responsibility) mentioned in sec. 2 flood back in if we explain responsibility 
for unwitting omissions only derivatively. In addition to this, if the vigilance account 
explains responsibility for unwitting omissions merely derivatively, then it is not clear 
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that the vigilance account offers a distinctive explanatory framework for responsibility 
for unwitting omissions. 
 There are two responses to this line of objection. First, even if the vigilance 
account does rely on tracing mechanisms to explain responsibility for unwitting 
omissions, the account goes beyond its predecessors by specifying a tracing anchor that is 
sufficient for grounding responsibility ascriptions. The tracing anchor in this case is some 
moment where the agent fails to exercise vigilance. Specifically, it would be some 
moment where the agent fails to properly exhibit a certain degree of awareness or 
attunement to the moral environment. Anchoring responsibility for future unwitting 
omissions in these failures avoids some regress problems raised against other tracing 
explanations of unwitting omissions. This means that tracing is, on the vigilance account, 
less theoretically problematic than we initially supposed (and less problematic than 
alternative tracing schemas). 
 Second, it is not clear to me that the vigilance account does furnish explanations 
only derivatively. To see this, consider a recent proposal of sufficient conditions on 
original responsibility for unwitting omissions given by Randolph Clarke. Clarke 
suggests that there are three conjointly sufficient conditions: 
Provided that the agent has the capacities that make her a morally 
responsible agent, she is blameworthy for such an omission if she is free in 
failing to [do] the thing in question and if her lack of awareness of her 
obligation to do it—and of the fact that she isn’t doing it—falls below a 
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cognitive standard that applies to her, given her cognitive and volitional 
abilities.32 
 
Clarke’s proposal contains three conditions that conjointly suffice for an agent to count as 
non-derivatively blameworthy: 
(i) Agent possesses capacities necessary to count as a moral agent 
(ii) Agent is free in omitting 
(iii) Agent’s awareness falls below an applicable cognitive standard33 
Explanations generated by the vigilance account conform to this standard. Consider Joel 
again. At the time of his omission, the vigilance account claims that Joel possesses all (or 
most) of his responsibility-relevant capacities. Joel is also free in behaving as he does 
(i.e., there are no counterfactual interveners or devious brain devices waiting to override 
his decisions). Finally, Joel’s awareness falls below an applicable cognitive standard, 
namely the level of vigilance specified by the norms of vigilance. Not only does the 
vigilance account offer explanations that conform to conditions on direct responsibility; 
the vigilance account explains why the unwitting agents fulfill these conditions at the 
time of wrongdoing. 
 This leaves an interesting question. Why does the vigilance account appear to 
offer tracing explanations of responsibility? What accounts for the tracing ‘residue’? I 
think two factors contribute to this illusion. First, the normative dimension of vigilance 
explains why we find people blameworthy (and why we accept judgments of 
																																																								
32 Clarke (2014: 167). 
33 In more recent work, Clarke (forthcoming: 13) suggests that (ii) and (iii) might just be ways of analyzing 
out the relevant capacities mentioned in (i). The argument here does not depend on whether (i) refers to 
capacities distinct from the capacities to which (ii) and (iii) refer. 
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blameworthiness) for unwitting omissions at all. The objection here might conflate this 
general justification for one feature of our ordinary practice (the norms of vigilance) with 
the justification for assigning responsibility for unwitting omissions in individual cases 
(conditions (i)-(iii) mentioned above). The norms of vigilance do not pick out failures 
that anchor a trace, but justify our general practice of holding people responsible for 
unwitting omissions.  
 Second, there might be a conflation of the roles that the cognitive standard plays 
in the vigilance account. The conditions under which the norms of vigilance apply to an 
agent are distinct (in this account) from the conditions on blameworthiness that an agent 
fulfills in virtue of the norms of vigilance. Recall that the application conditions on the 
norms of vigilance track the possession (or lack thereof) of the vigilance capacity, while 
the content of the norms tracks the level of attunement that an agent possesses in virtue of 
exercising vigilance. This adds the illusion of tracing because on any occasion where we 
assign blame for an unwitting omission we seemingly require an appeal to some earlier 
time at which the agent fulfills the application conditions of the norms of vigilance and 
the cognitive standard. Thus, the tracing illusion arises from the confusion of the 
conditions under which the cognitive standard applies to a particular agent in a context 
and the conditions under which some agent is culpable for an unwitting omission in those 
same circumstances. 
  
Conclusion 
I began with a puzzle that arises when one adopts a Capacity Account and the theory of 
moral responsibility that the Capacity Account implies. The puzzle focuses on the fact 
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that we sometimes hold people responsible even when they appear to lack or fail to 
exercise relevant agential capacities that are constitutive of moral agency. This appears to 
indicate that moral responsibility does not track the possession and exercise of capacities. 
I argued that one should develop the Capacity Account in certain ways to resolve the 
puzzle. The development occurs along two lines: (i) a distinct normative account of moral 
responsibility for unwitting omissions that claims that agents are culpable for their 
unwitting omissions when their awareness is substandard with respect to some applicable 
cognitive standard, and; (ii) a framework that specifies a set of adequate neural realizers 
for the abilities posited by the normative account. This framework specifies what the 
mechanism of control in unwitting omissions comes to in a way that is compatible with 
the Capacity Account and the corresponding approach to moral responsibility mentioned 
at the outset.  
 If this is right, then the central question for picture of responsibility that falls out 
of the Capacity Account is not whether we have the capacities required for us to be the 
appropriate targets of responsibility ascriptions, but instead, the conditions under which 
we fail to meet appropriate standards for vigilance. 
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